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Abstract  
This paper looks at the tragedy of Qiao Feng in Jin Yong’s The Demi-Gods and 
the Semi-Devils. While it is common practice for Žižekean scholars to examine 
genre writing and popular culture with Lacanian theory, the martial arts genre has 
received little attention. In Demi-Gods, Qiao Feng experiences an ‘identity crisis’ at 
the peak of his career: rumour has it that though he was raised and trained in 
China, he was born a Khitan. Qiao Feng at first believes it is a just conspiracy, and 
henceforth is blind-sided by the imaginary relation between his ego and small 
others. He mis-recognises others’ scheming as ‘the Other of the Other,’ while his 
supposedly deceased Khitan father occupies the corner of the Other in the 
schema L to orchestra the manipulation game. However, what Qiao Feng is really 
under prey is the desire of the father, and of the two fatherlands, one Han-Chinese, 
one Khitan: his tragedy lies in the split of the national Other, in the impossibility of 
the ethical imperative Your duty is to be loyal to your country. And yet, it is exactly 
because of the emptiness in the ethical call that Qiao Feng can start to act as a 
subject, a subject that is by definition already always split. This paper thus 
interprets the actions of Jin Yong’s hero according to Lacan’s schema L, and also 
provides variations of the schema based on the twists and turns of this martial arts 
tragedy. 
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The Demi-Gods and the Semi-Devils (Jin Yong 1978) is set in the years of the Northern 
Song (960-1127 AD). During this tumultuous time the Chinese empire was under 
constant threat from the Liao kingdom, formed by the nomadic Khitan people, and the 
antagonism between the two powers had an impact on the martial arts society. A xia, or 
a chivalric gallant, has the duty of safeguarding the ‘good’, which includes the good of 
one’s country and the well-being of its people. Esteemed martial arts schools such as 
Shaolin and Wudang at such a time necessarily see themselves as nationalist, and so 
does the Beggars’ Guild, the ubiquity of whose members make it the most powerful of 
the guilds and schools.  
Qiao Feng, in his prime at age thirty, is the present leader of the Beggars’ Guild. 
He seems well respected by all sides for his superb martial arts skills and brilliant 
leadership, proven by several patriotic actions against the Northern nomads. But soon 
after his appearance in Demi-Gods, he faces a challenge: half of the guild is determined 
to dethrone him, for a reason that no one dares to reveal. Try as he may, Qiao Feng 
can only conclude that it is a conspiracy conjured up by his adversaries. In the martial 
arts world one can offend people without knowing, and fame and status easily invite 
envy and resentment. Despite the suspicion and uncertainty though, Qiao Feng is more 
than ready to confront the conspiracy against him: ‘Go ahead and pull out your most 
scheming tricks. I Qiao Feng have never acted against my conscience in my whole life, 
so what do I have to fear of your plotting and framing?’ (Jin Yong 1978, chap. 15). 
 
The judge of the truth: the big Other 
What Qiao Feng ultimately has faith in is the big Other. Though he may be suspect in 
others’ eyes, he has faith that when facing the judgement of truth itself, and of right and 
wrong, he himself is righteous and has nothing to hide. He has always adhered to 
conduct of becoming a hero, and has always seen it as his duty to exemplify the 
principles of the Guild: to come to the aid of the weak, be loyal to the country, and help 
protect the Song Empire from its Khitan enemy. How could the guarantor of justice not 
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approve of him and be on his side? But is there really such a big Other that oversees 
everything and guarantees justice? 
Sure enough, following one event after another, Qiao Feng’s faith in the big Other 
is eventually shattered. Firstly, some hidden letters emerge, bringing to light a massacre 
that occurred thirty years prior. An assembly of Chinese martial arts masters had come 
to the border to launch an ambush upon a group of Khitan soldiers and fighters who, 
according to intelligence, were going to enter Han territory with malicious intentions. A 
Khitan group of men and women did show up and the Han camp had an advantageous 
start in attacking. But it soon become evident to the Han camp that this group of Khitans 
were not soldiers or trained practitioners, as they could hardly defend themselves in 
combat. The tip-off the Song masters received was obviously erroneous (later we find 
this to be part of an elaborate double-cross) and there was only one Khitan man in this 
group who could fight. He did his best to protect his people, including the woman and 
child who appeared to be his family. Even though his formidable combat skills outshone 
that of the Han group, he could not alone defeat them. At the end, too grieved to 
continue fighting after seeing the loss of his people and his wife, he leapt off a cliff. The 
only survivor of the Khitan camp was the infant, the child of the Khitan warrior. 
Qiao Feng is that infant, now thirty years old and a hero of the battles against the 
Khitan. The very kung fu masters who taught him everything he knows were 
accomplices to the border massacre that took his real parents’ lives. After realising that 
the Qiao couple who brought him up are his foster parents, Qiao Feng is at a loss: 
 
 If I were a Khitan, then wouldn’t I be the most disloyal person by having killed 
several Khitan people, destroyed war plans of my country? And wouldn’t I be the 
most disgraceful son, if my parents were murdered by Han people at the border 
and I looked up to the killers as my masters, mistaking them to be dear parental 
figures to me? My, Qiao Feng, what shame that you live as such a scandalous, 
disloyal person. And if Mr Qiao were not my real father, then should I not be Qiao 
Feng either? What’s my family name? What name did my father give me? Alas, 
not only am I a disloyal citizen and shameful son, I’m also a person without a 
name. (Jin Yong 1978, chap. 18) 
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Qiao Feng, after thinking thus to himself, nevertheless feels more determined than 
ever: “But then, what if all of this is but the tricking and plotting of some evilest character? 
How could I Qiao Feng, a man of pride, let others ruin my life and meddle in my fate like 
this?” (idem, chap. 18). 
 
Conspiracy theory: the Other of the Other 
Qiao Feng becomes determined in his following actions not because he is more 
confident in the Other which should be on his side; quite the opposite, his resolution 
comes from the belief that someone or something is responsible not only for the 
malicious plotting and scheming, but also for the turn of his fate, for temporarily 
obscuring the big Other qua Justice. 
He goes to visit the site of the massacre, hoping to find traces of the encounter 
that happened thirty years ago. As though the past is re-enacted, he finds a Song troop 
hunting down a group of Khitan civilians as prey. An elderly Khitan who has seen his 
fellow tribesmen killed and has been fatally wounded himself, rips open his shirt, howls 
to the sky, and dies. Underneath the ripped shirt is a wolf’s head tattooed in blue ink, 
identical to the one on Qiao Feng’s own chest. Qiao Feng’s identity is thus revealed: the 
wolf’s head is the symbol of one of the most distinguished families of Khitan, the Xiao 
clan, and all Xiao boys are tattooed with the mark at a young age. 
Uncertainties and suspicions are cleared up: Qiao Feng’s surname is not Qiao, but 
Xiao. He is not Han-Chinese but Khitan. The ambush that took his parents’ lives was 
organised by a highly respected kung fu master known to everyone as Lead Brother, 
who is thus the direct cause of Xiao Feng’s misfortune. There is no need for Xiao Feng, 
or Qiao Feng, to wonder, ‘Why me?’ There is now a villain and he is to blame for 
everything and must pay for Xiao Feng’s parents’ deaths. But who exactly is Lead 
Brother? The band of Han martial arts masters, who having witnessed the death of Xiao 
Feng’s parents and tribesmen survived the border massacre, would certainly know who 
he is. But as Xiao Feng finds out the whereabouts of each of the elders involved in the 
border massacre, that person is mysteriously discovered dead. For Xiao Feng this only 
shows the extent of the conspiracy: Lead Brother is murdering the elders in order to 
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the analyst the analysant 
remain anonymous. As if to double Lead Brother’s apparent villainy, there are always 
traces that link these murders to Xiao Feng. Some victims seem to have died from 
punches that resemble Xiao Feng’s signature kung fu move; there are even witnesses 
who claim to have seen Xiao Feng fleeing from the crime scene.  
Xiao Feng starts to refer to the still unknown Lead Brother as the Villain. This is a 
familiar logic of fantasy: whenever the rightful order is threatened, it is always due to the 
conspiracy of the evil Other. A conspiracy theory can work like this: firstly, one accepts 
that the big Other does actually exist and that there is a ‘right order of things.’ Secondly, 
one believes that there is someone to blame for the malfunctioning Other, for the world 
that has gone wrong. The Villain is the figure of the Other of the Other: if it weren’t for 
you, my symbolic universe would still be intact and whole; I would still be the hero, who 
has done nothing wrong in the eye of the symbolic Other. What is behind the conspiracy 
theory is however a more menacing conspiracy: to have one think that someone is to 
blame for the schism of society, to overlook the reality that the society is never a whole, 
and is always split and inharmonious (Žižek 1994: 50). 
 
The Villain and the Other: misrecognition 
Xiao Feng’s belief in the Villain, in the Other of the Other, is a classic example of 
misrecognition: an actual person, the Villain, is conflated with the role of the Other. It is 
a conflation of two different registers, the imaginary and the symbolic, exactly what 
Lacan warns analysts against when he sketches the schema L:  
 
  
 (Es) S a? (other) 
  
(ego) a A (Other) 
 
Fig. 1. Schema L: the analytic scene (adapted from Lacan 2006: 40) 
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If we see the schema L as Xiao Feng’s grid of subjectivity, what Xiao Feng should pay 
more attention to is the S-A vector, but as the schema illustrates, the symbolic axis is 
half-way obscured by the axis between a (ego) and a′ (other), the relation between the 
opposing couple who are “involved in reciprocal imaginary objectification” of a mirror 
stage relation (Lacan 2006: 41). Just like in an analysis, it would be a mistake to do 
psychoanalytic work based on this kind of two-person relationship, and Xiao Feng’s first 
wrong move is to focus on this relation only, thereby allowing the antagonism, 
competitiveness, and envy (the drama that is characteristic of the mirror stage) to 
consume his time and energy. 
Lacan (1993 [1955-1956]) uses the metaphor of card games to explicate the 
difference between the imaginary and symbolic relations. He likens the two-person 
scenario to the mind game between two card players: each tries to guess the 
opponent’s hand (by reading certain body movements such as a facial tic or the 
caressing of a wedding ring), in order to gain an advantage, and this is what Xiao Feng 
is mainly doing with his opponent, the Villain: Lead Brother. However, Lacan suggests 
that what can better describe the analytic dual is a game of bridge, where there are four 
players involved. Firstly, while the analysand does see himself in the ego (moi), his 
subjectivity also lies somewhere else, in the position of S, as indicated in the schema L. 
This is the ‘him’ that he himself does not know of (or the unconscious part of himself). S 
is capitalised, indicating its unconscious status just like that of A, the Other. As to the 
analyst, she also has an ego, comprised of her personality and the values that inform 
her judgement. However, she does not play her role alone and has another partner, the 
dummy, which is a hand that the French call le mort, the death. The analyst “must be 
dead enough not to be caught up in the imaginary relation,” (Lacan 1993 [1955-1956]: 
162) so as to “bring out the fourth player”, the subjectivity (S) in the analysand (Lacan 
2006: 492).  
Xiao Feng, being in the position of the analysand, should envision that beyond the 
imaginary relationship between his ego (a) and the Villain’s ego (a′), his unconscious 
subjectivity (S) is also at stake. His opponent, like the analyst, plays not just one hand 
but two hands, by enlisting the hand of the dummy which is allocated in the corner of A 
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(big Other). However, Xiao Feng spends most of his time and energy second-guessing 
the Villain, playing against him on the level of the specular relation, of the mirror stage. 
Before the final twist is revealed, Xiao Feng does indeed have a growing uneasiness 
whenever he sees his own image in the mirror. At one point, he briefly sees someone 
who looks just like him. His look-alike is Ah Zhu in disguise. Ah Zhu later becomes Xiao 
Feng’s lover, but at that time she is only known to Xiao Feng as the house maid of 
Murong Fu, the other major character in the novel. Ah Zhu is an expert in putting on 
disguises and at the time is attempting to rescue some trapped Beggars’ Guild 
members by pretending to be Xiao Feng without his knowing. 
As the story unfolds, we find that Xiao Feng’s suspicion about there being a 
criminal double who is framing him for murders is not unfounded. There is another 
Villain who has been the true mastermind, staging the murders of those who know Lead 
Brother’s identity, as well as manipulating Xiao Feng’s hostility against Lead Brother. 
This Villain behind the Villian is no other than Xiao Feng’s supposedly dead father. Xiao 
Feng’s father Xiao Yuanshan has been playing dead. He had jumped off the cliff, but 
due to luck and his superhuman kung fu, he didn’t die, and later returned to the 
precarious martial arts world. 
Xiao Yuanshan has been following Xiao Feng around and framing his son for the 
murders, doing so easily thanks to their close resemblance in appearance. But the 
reason that Xiao Yuanshan, the real Villain, can manipulate Xiao Feng is not so much 
that he resembles his son physically, but that he evokes the symbolic register by dint of 
being the father: the position of A is the position of the Name-of-the-Father (Lacan 2006: 
462)1. The subjectivity of being a son, is what really triggers Xiao Feng’s guilt and 
revengeful desire; it is what renders him vulnerable in the imaginary set-up between his 
ego and the alter ego, the latter presumed by him to be Lead Brother.  
 
The father, the Other, and the superego	  
On one level, Xiao Feng’s error is to stake too much on the imaginary relationship, 
directing his cunning towards Lead Brother who is in the position of the small other. 
Devoting his effort on the imaginary axis only, he overlooks the actual conspirator of the 
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‘conspiracy’ against him, his father Xiao Yuanshan, who stands in the place of the Other:
  
 (Es) S a? (other) 
  
(ego) a A (Other) 
 
Fig. 1.a. Schema L 
Being at the vantage point of A, Xiao Yuanshan is able to manipulate the players on the 
imaginary register, Xiao Feng and Lead Brother, to his own use. Xiao Yuanshan himself 
plays two parts: first as a father who employs the specular, hence the imaginary 
advantage of resembling the son, and second as the Other Villain who is able to be A in 
the schema L. This is ultimately because there is a non-coincidence between the actual 
father as the person, and the symbolic father as the paternal metaphor. “[T]he symbolic 
father is a metaphor, a metaphoric substitute, a sublation [Aufhebung] of the real [actual, 
physical] father in its Name which is ‘more father than father himself’’, hence the term: 
‘the Name-of-the-Father’ that Lacan uses almost synonymously for ‘paternal metaphor’ 
(Žižek 2002: 134). As a corollary of being the symbolic figure, Xiao Yuanshan knows 
well what the son wants and desires as the subject, and he exploits the unconscious 
relation between S (Xiao Feng’s subjectivity) and A (the role of the Other that the father 
plays). 
What exactly does it mean when we say Xiao Yuanshan knows well the desire of 
our protagonist? First of all, paternal demands teach the subject his first lessons about 
social values and cultural idioms. Žižek (1996: 167) explains it thus: “what I desire is 
predetermined and at the Other Place: my desire is ‘mediated’ by the symbolic network 
of the cultural tradition”. Xiao Feng’s desire is mediated by what his father and his 
fatherland demand of him. Indeed the filial responsibility (xiao) and loyalty (zhong) are 
two virtues highly regarded in Chinese tradition and in the martial arts genre.   
The demands of filial responsibility and loyalty are symbolic demands because 
they do not change when one’s father is deceased, or when one’s nation no longer 
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exists. In Xiao Feng’s case, the symbolic demands do not change even when his father 
is the Villain, even when previously Xiao Feng had believed it to be his utmost duty to 
overthrow the Liao Empire, and kill as many ‘Khitan dogs’ as possible. Xiao Yuanshan 
knows that as a dutiful son Xiao Feng will still have to revere the father and respect his 
wishes. Similarly, Xiao Feng knows the father knows too, even when the father’s wishes 
or desires involve sabotaging plans of the Song troop, and killing Song masters. These 
masters include Xiao Feng’s own teacher, without whom he would not have become the 
leader of the Beggars’ Guild, and the Shaolin shifu who gave Xiao Feng the mission of 
organising the campaign against the Khitan. Which father should Xiao Feng (or Qiao 
Feng) listen to? Whose demand should he adhere to, since fulfilling one father’s wish 
would mean failing the other’s? We will return to this ethical dilemma later. 
The price of Xiao Feng’s misrecognition of the imaginary for the symbolic is a 
number of innocent lives, including his beloved Ah Zhu’s, sacrificed. But there is another 
kind of misrecognition at work here for which he pays a bigger price: Xiao Feng does 
not see the dimension of the real in the symbolic relation between him and his father. A 
son will always presume his father to be the best, the most heroic xia. When Xiao 
Yuanshan has finally come back to life, he turns out to be the opposite of the ideal 
father: he is the Villain who uses his own son as the vehicle of vengeance on all those 
who have been part of the border ambush. Yet he is still the father whose symbolic 
demands – to be a good son and remain loyal to the Khitan clan – will remain 
unconditionally binding. We can even say that the function of the symbolic father and 
the imaginary father is to cover up the fact that the father is also an obscene creature, 
withholding unspeakable desire, and Xiao Yuanshan is exactly this super-egoic father of 
the real who plays his own son like a fool. While the symbolic father, according to Žižek 
(2002: 134), is the sublation of the man who is the father, there is something left un-
sublated: ‘the ‘non-sublated’ part of the father’ is the father of the real, who ‘appears as 
the obscene, cruel and oddly impotent agency of the superego’. The ‘oddly impotent’ 
aspect of the real father in Žižek’s arguments here is then to be understood as his 
failure to fulfil the paternal task of setting correct and moral examples. A super-egoic 
master even actively subverts the paternal demand by transgressions that involve 
cruelty and obscenity. All of Xiao Yuanshan’s  ruthless killings and manipulation of Xiao 
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Feng’s fate are based on one secret desire, unknown to his son: the desire to avenge 
his ill fate on everyone, Khitan or not, Han or not.  
The impact that the border ambush has on Xiao Yuanshan is just as grave as his 
son Xiao Feng’s loss of faith in an Other that should be knowing and just. Liao and 
Song at the time enjoyed a relatively peaceful relationship. Xiao Yuanshan was a great 
favourite of the dowager Xiao of the Liao Empire, and was made a high-rank general 
because of his unparalleled combat skills, which he learned from his Han shifu at a 
young age. With a successful career and a new-born son, Xiao Yuanshan had planned 
a trip to the Song China to pay his shifu his gratitude when the ambush occurred. One 
moment he was at the top of the world the next moment he had fallen to the bottom. 
The Other was no longer the guarantor of justice and karma. Worse, unlike Xiao Feng, 
Xiao Yuanshan could not even conjure up an evil Other of the Other to provide 
justification for his ill fate; there is no plausible explanation whatsoever for the attack 
and consequential loss of his family members. No one is to blame, and yet the world is 
against him, so the target of his revenge becomes the whole world. 
What Xiao Yuanshan is not aware of, however, is that while he toys with other 
people’s lives, his own life is the target of another ‘conspiracy’. His seemingly 
unpredictable misfortunes have a direct cause: it is Murong Bo who designed and set 
up the whole border ambush. Murong Bo was the one who created the false intelligence 
about a Khitan assault that led Lead Brother to organise the ambush. And why is 
Murong Bo doing this? This has to do with another ‘Name-of-the-Father’ – Murong is the 
surname of the royal family of the Yan Kingdom during the Sixteen Kingdoms period 
(304-439 AD). The Kingdom was built by the Xianbei clan of Hunnish descent, and was 
extinguished long ago during the wars between several tribes and kingdoms. Ever since, 
every Murong member has the demand laid upon them of being a filial child, and the 
only way to meet this demand is to rebuild the fatherland and bring back the glory of the 
Yan Kingdom. What we have here is a chain of superegos. Xiao Feng blames the 
(illusion of) the Other of the Other for his turn of fate, and it turns out to be his father, 
Xiao Yuanshan, who plays the super-egoic Other. When Xiao Yuanshan orchestrates 
revenges and killings on others by being in the Other’s seat, he does not know he is but 
a pawn in Murong Bo’s scheme. As for Murong Bo himself, he cannot shun the demand 
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of the Name-of-the-Father and not understand that he is only there to meet the desire of 
his forefathers. 
Whenever one conjures up a conspiracy theory, the fantasy of the Other of the 
Other arises. And when there is one Other of the Other, there will be yet another Other 
of the Other behind the previous one, and it goes on and on. But what initiates the string 
of superegos, or the Others of the Others in the first place is the belief in a transcendent 
agency. Before finding out about all these superego figures (Lead Brother, Xiao 
Yuanshan and Murong Bo) Xiao Feng has already been plagued by guilt: ‘Alas, not only 
am I a disloyal citizen and shameful son, I’m also a person without a name’ (Jin Yong 
1978, chap. 18). And ‘we are guilty’, Zizek argues, ‘in so far as we accept that the big 
Other exists in the guise of a transcendent agency which plays a perverse game of cat 
and mouse, knowing well what our duty is but concealing it from us’ (1996: 171).  
‘Knowing well what our duty is’ means there is always symbolic demand; 
‘concealing it from us’, on the other hand, means the demand can never be met. 
Demands, by definition, cannot be fulfilled. That is why ultimately, the demand of the 
Other is the desire of the Other: you tell me this, but what exactly do you want me to do? 
Things are much easier when one presumes there is ‘an external agent with whom a 
relationship of exchange, sacrifice, ‘haggling’, is possible’ (Žižek 1996: 171). By doing 
so, the moral law is ‘reduced to the level of ‘representation’, ‘becomes an object that 
stands opposite ourselves’, and ceases to be ‘the absolute Other’ (idem: 171). The 
Other is demanding, but there is no way to confirm what its demands really are, while 
one is still obligated to do the right thing. Thus, does the Other exist, or not? It does not 
exist, because it does not provide answers; but at the same time it also does exist, 
otherwise the subject would not ever feel pressed by its demands. One way to look at 
this antimony is to consider the differences between ‘il n’y a pas… [there is not]’ and 
‘n’existe pas [doesn’t exist]’ that Žižek discusses in his Less Than Nothing:  
 
We should also not confuse the series of Lacan’s ‘il n’y a pas…’ (de l’Autre) with 
the series of ‘n’existe pas’: ‘n’existe pas’ denies the full symbolic existence of the 
negated object . . . , while ‘il n’y a pas’ is more radical, it denies the very pre-
essential nomadic being of specters and other pre-ontological entities. In short, la 
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Femme n’existe pas, mais il y a des femmes [the Woman does not exist, but there 
are women]. (2012: 798) 
 
Therefore, ‘God does not exist, but ‘there are gods’ who haunt us; the unconscious 
does not exist as a full ontological entity, . . . but it insists in haunting us’ (798). That is 
to say, while the symbolic Other does not exist as an entity (its real Demand also does 
not exist, is empty), its demands and desires nevertheless haunt us. The ‘il n’y a pas’ in 
‘there is no Other of the Other’ would mean a more radical negation of its existence. It is 
in the same category as ‘there is no sexual relation’. There is no Other of the Other, no 
superego, no transcendent agency that guarantees the truth. And there is certainly no 
conspirator behind the evil scheme of Heaven when things go wrong; at the same time, 
it does not mean that a conspirator cannot play the role of a superego, or of a 
mastermind of the Other of the Other – the subject can take up any position of the four 
corners in the schema L, as we have seen several times thus far. 
 
Retribution, for whom? 
In order to ‘gentrify’ or ‘soften’ the utter Otherness of the Law (Žižek 1996: 171), one 
comes up with external agencies to represent the moral law. If the subject can play the 
Other of the Other, the super-egoic Other like Xiao Yuanshan or Murong Bo, then she 
can certainly take up the role of the moral agency: one is but the flipside of the other. 
The kung fu masters are exactly such subjects, as they do presume to be 
representatives of the big Other, upholding justice. This explains the theme and 
structure of retribution in martial arts fiction, the repetitive cycle of revenge, payback 
time, and the debt redeemable only by blood, played out by dint of the conflation of the 
symbolic and the imaginary.  
The kung fu masters act in the name of justice, considering themselves the 
instrument of the big Other, carrying out laws and punishments. Xiao Feng is no 
exception. When he was the leader of the Beggars’ Guild and his reputation was still 
intact, he thought it was right to protect the Song civilians from the ‘barbaric’ Khitan tribe 
at all cost, and the lives of Khitan civilians could be dispensed without any ethical 
conflict. After his turn of fate, avenging his parents is all he could think of, because 
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revenge means getting things even and balancing the accounts: you took my father’s 
life, so you should pay back with your life or the life of your beloved; I have the right to 
collect the debt from you. Kung fu masters are like self-appointed bookkeepers as well 
as executioners of the big Other. The actions they take, no matter how cruel and 
ruthless, are to ensure the balance of universal karma, guaranteeing that good deeds 
are rewarded, bad deeds reprimanded, and all adhere to the cycle. While the Buddhist 
notion of karma may incite hope for a better afterlife, martial arts masters are more 
interested in speeding things up, preferring to give the verdict in the present life2.
 What will it be like when it is this subject who takes the seat in corner A of the 
schema L? To explain this, Lacan (2006: 250) switches from the analogy of a game of 
bridge to the metaphor of theatre, and refers to the spot of A as the spectator’s box, in 
which the subject has his seat. The kind of subject who takes the seat in the spectator’s 
box, ‘invisible from the stage’, is the obsessive subject. But, paradoxically, it is by being 
‘merely the spectator’ (idem: 250), seemingly ‘placed on the sidelines’ (Fink 2004: 27), 
that ‘the very possibility of the game and pleasure’ is constituted for him (Lacan qtd. in 
Fink 2004: 28). It is a double-play, or a double-dealing, for the obsessive, on both the 
symbolic and the imaginary levels. On the one hand, being in the position of the Other, 
the subject is an indifferent onlooker, who is again playing dead. He is ‘dead in a sense’, 
and keeps himself ‘out of the line of fire’ (Fink 2004: 27). On the other hand, he is not 
only involved but also enjoys the ‘circus games between the two others’ (Lacan 2006: 
526), the heated actions of the firing line that takes place on the imaginary axis. In effect, 
this spectacle of a circus game is arranged by the obsessive himself for the big Other to 
see, even though he himself is also assuming this role. He ‘puts on a show’, ‘addresses 
his ambiguous homage towards the box in which he himself has his seat, that of the 
master who cannot be seen [se voir]’ (idem: 250) – or who cannot see himself, and thus 
cannot see his own desire. 
 
Lively game, mortified desire 
For a subject who cannot see himself, Bruce Fink adapts the four-corner schema into a 
three-legged one: 
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 a′ (other) 
  
(ego) a A (Other) 
 
Fig. 2. Three-cornered Schema L (adapted from Fink 2004: 27) 
 
On the one hand, Xiao Feng is blindsided by the retributive actions and consequently 
falls prey to the super-egoic fathers Xiao Yuanshan and, beyond him, Murong Bo. On 
the other hand, the engagement with imaginary second-guessing with the opponents 
are there to keep Xiao Feng busy, so that he does not have to face his own desire, or 
the fact that his desire is already made mortified, due to the inconsistency of the Other 
itself.  
The best arena to illustrate the intense but unnecessary imaginary game is the 
bloodbath in Juxian Mansion (Jin Yong 1978, chap. 19). Xiao Feng accidentally causes 
Ah Zhu a serious injury, and thinking himself partially responsible for Ah Zhu’s injury he 
ventures to go to Juxian Mansion to seek medical help from the well-known Doctor Xue, 
nicknamed ‘Foe of Death God’, who at the time is organising the ‘heroes’ forum’ with 
other eminent martial arts figures at the Mansion. The forum’s purpose is to get together 
as many kung fu good fellows as they can, converse over Rivers and Lakes affairs, and 
most importantly, form a united line against Xiao Feng’s Khitan malevolence (by this 
time almost everyone has heard of the murders that Xiao Feng supposedly committed). 
It is needless to narrate the ruthless battling between Xiao Feng and the rest of the 
heroes at the forum. There can only be a possible outcome: many will die, including 
Xiao Feng, who would have been killed at the final stage of the chaotic fight were it not 
for the rescue from his father. 
In Demi-Gods the division of Good/Evil, a fundamental set-up for martial arts genre 
and other genre writings, is transformed into the ‘division of Hu/Han’ (‘Hu’ refers to all 
foreigners and has the connotation of being uncivilised), as the title of the novel’s 
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Chapter 19 says. The Han-Chinese gallants and adepts on one side, Xiao Feng the 
Khitan barbarian on the other, each presumes justice to be on its side, both ending up 
stuck in the imaginary dramas: when both presume the licence to kill, it is difficult to tell 
which is the good or the evil, since one is but the alter ego of the other. For Xiao Feng’s 
subjectivity, the spectacle of bloodshed in the Mansion ‘consists in showing that [the 
subject] is invulnerable’; for it is ‘important to show how far the other – the small ego, 
who is merely his alter ego, the double of himself – can go’ (Lacan qtd. in Fink 2004: 28). 
Juxian Mansion is no other than an arena of egos, vicissitudes of Xiao Feng’s ego. The 
bursting out of his indignation, pride, and ‘barbaric’ impulse resembles the mechanism 
of resistances and defensive moves that one displays when facing the analyst, or any 
other who is imputed to be one’s alter ego or double3. In Juxian Mansion, Qiao Feng is 
trapped in his assumptions about who he is and what he is like in the eye of the others. 
What he struggles to gain is in no different to what his opponents are aiming for: it is all 
about winning and losing, about getting even, showing off one’s martial arts skills, and 
dealing with biases and prejudices. 
For Qiao Feng there is a sole purpose to the imaginary interaction he partakes in 
with Lead Brother, his father, or anybody who has done him wrong: ‘showing that he is 
invulnerable’, as Lacan says. The need to appear invulnerable and invincible springs 
from the need to hide the fact that he is, in truth, vulnerable. He invests in the activities 
developing upon the imaginary relation of a-a′, while knowing only too well that they will 
cost him dearly. What other outcome does he expect upon meeting hundreds of rivals in 
Juxian Mansion? ‘Didn’t I make a fool of myself in front of everybody by my stubborn 
decision of risking myself for Ah Zhu?’ he wonders to himself (Jin Yong 1978, chap. 19). 
Even so, he cannot do otherwise, because by engaging himself in the lively game, Qiao 
Feng is at the same time staying out of the firing line, avoiding confronting where his 
tragedy really lies.  
Lacan calls this subject an obsessive: an obsessive is ‘an actor who plays his role 
and assures a certain number of acts as if he were dead’ (qtd. in Fink 2004: 28). In view 
of the structure of the obsessive subjectivity, Qiao Feng/Xiao Feng is indeed already 
dead. The subject ‘has, in some sense, killed in advance the desire in himself; he has, 
so to speak, mortified it’ (Lacan qtd. in Fink 2004: 28). And the purpose of taking up the 
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seat of the Other and faking death is only to stay invisible, according to Fink. It is to hide 
the fourth player further away, or even to make it disappear, to the extent of collapsing 
into the place of A (Fink 2004: 27-28; see figure 2).  
The bloodshed in Juxian Mansion on the other hand also confirms Xiao Feng’s 
status as a tragic hero: ‘it is an honour to be guilty’, says Hegel (Zupančič 2000: 173). 
Xiao Feng can no longer claim he is innocent and guilt-free, that all the wrong doings 
are done by others, or the Others of the Other, namely his father and Murong Bo. Xiao 
Feng himself, a stubborn and impulsive barbarian, is to blame for the loss of Han lives 
that he has vowed to protect but ended up killing at the Mansion battle. But what makes 
him a tragic hero is more than his untamed temperament or personality – that will be too 
imaginary and lack the dimension of the real. 
 
The national Thing 
The voice of conscience and the sensation of an all-seeing gaze of the Other, as we 
have discussed, are but representations of a ‘false transcendence’, of the Other of the 
Other or the superego underside of the Other. Their function is to screen us from what 
we really cannot cope with, the ‘true transcendence’ of the pure Law and the ‘Otherness 
of the Imperative’ (Žižek 1996 171). Under the imaginary relation, ‘under the neighbour 
as my semblable, my mirror image, there always lurks the unfathomable abyss of 
radical Otherness, a Thing that cannot be ‘gentrified’’ (Žižek 2005: 320). ‘In order to 
render our co-existence with the Thing minimally bearable, the symbolic order qua 
Third . . . has to intervene’ (idem: 321). Even someone like Qiao Feng/Xiao Feng, who 
is unsure of his surname and who has failed both demands of loyalty and filial 
responsibility, will still have no choice but to obey the pure Law: no matter who he is and 
what has happened to him, he still just has to do his duty as a xia. The emptiness of this 
ethical call is far more terrifying than the perverse game of cat and mouse that the 
external agencies play with the subjects. An Other that is characterised or imaginarised 
into an obscene godly creature is still the better of the two evils. Life will still be easier 
when one can blame everything on the capricious ‘Ruler of Heaven’ (Laotianye), a 
Chinese by-name for such an Other, accuse it of ‘knowing well what our duty is but 
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concealing it from us’ (Žižek 1996: 171), and lament that ‘Fate plays on us all’ (zaohua-
nongren), as the Chinese saying goes.  
In his Seminar III (1993 [1955-1956]), Lacan draws the schema L to explain the 
dialectic between the analyst and the analysand. The psychoanalytic scene is first and 
foremost an ethical scene. By playing the dummy, stepping into the seat of the Other, 
what the analyst does is not to provide a signifier that can hang things together for the 
patient and in so doing to assure the patient that everything will be fine. What the 
analyst does instead is to speak from the point of a crossed-out Other, a point that gives 
no guarantee. The analyst ‘authorizes himself in the sense of being fully responsible for 
what he refers to as his duty, without any guarantee from the big Other’ (Žižek 1996: 
169-70). This ‘without any guarantee’ is the common ground for all ethical acts that 
follow the categorical imperative of Do your duty!. While the injunction is seemingly 
issued from the Other in its seat of the theatre box, the imperative is enigmatic: ‘Do your 
duty!’: ‘Your duty is to do your duty’: ‘Your duty is… (silence)’. It is a saying that is half-
said (mi-dire), an utterance emptily enunciated, for its importance is in the act of saying 
it rather than the content (which can thus be tautological or contradictory). It is then up 
to the subject ‘to translate this injunction into a determinate moral obligation, and left 
with uncertainty; the subject never knows if he has “got it right”’ (idem: 169).  
The ethical Thing in martial arts fiction, following Žižek’s arguments above, can be 
phrased as ‘Do your duty as a hero or xia’. How does one achieve that? That is what Jin 
Yong never stops asking in his novels. While Jin Yong searches for answers, and 
indeed sometimes provides them, they can only be half-answered, half-said. In Demi-
Gods, Qiao Feng/Xiao Feng is primarily portrayed as a charismatic martial arts adept 
who bows to no one and fears no adversary. But at the same time he ranks zhong or 
national loyalty (to the Han-Song Empire) above all values and is deemed a hero by his 
active devotion to the nation4. However, as we have been discussing, once the 
suspicion of his non-Han identity is raised, the duties and values that he adheres to 
become ambiguous and less than absolute. And the injunction from the Other qua Third, 
the symbolic tenet Be loyal to your country! itself turns into the Other qua Thing: the 
ethical Thing in Demi-Gods is the national Thing.  
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As previously mentioned, the opposition between Good and Evil, a common 
theme in the martial arts genre, is transformed into that between Hu (all foreigners) and 
Han-Chinese people in Demi-Gods. For Qiao Feng/Xiao Feng, the inconsistency of the 
big Other firstly denotes the impotence of the Other in guaranteeing the truth and justice. 
Secondly, the inconsistency is a matter of a constitutive split within the Other, and that 
split is what allows for the conflict between the loyalties towards Han and Liao Empires, 
between the two fatherlands. 
 
Qiao/Xiao Feng’s dilemma, the split subject’s freedom 
Fink’s modified version of the schema L is a three-cornered diagram with S ‘truncated’ 
(see Figure 2 above). As the obsessive subject, Qiao/Xiao Feng endeavours to stay out 
of the line of fire, the result of which is that he ceases to exist. Nonetheless, it is not so 
much that Qiao/Xiao Feng stops existing when he tucks his being away, as that 
Qiao/Xiao Feng only starts to really exist as a subject when he finds out God is dead, 
the Other doesn’t exist. For Lacan, subjectivity emerges only when he is in the act of 
asking questions:  
 
the question of the subject’s existence arises for him, not in the kind of anxiety it 
provokes at the level of the ego, . . . but as an articulated question – ’What am I 
there?’ – about his sex and his contingency in being: namely, that on the one hand 
he is a man or a woman, and on the other hand he might not be, the two 
conjugating their mystery and knotting it in symbols of procreation and death. 
(Lacan 2006: 459) 
 
Xiao Yuanshan’s re-appearance brings Qiao Feng the deadly sign that mortifies 
his desire: he is no longer just Qiao Feng, but Qiao/Xiao Feng. The question of 
existence of Qiao/Xiao Feng is not ‘Am I woman or man?’ Rather the question is, ‘Am I 
a Khitan or Han?’ The real reason behind the futile combats and unnecessary sacrifices 
of lives, is Qiao/Xiao Feng’s powerlessness when facing ‘the unfathomable abyss of 
radical Otherness’, the national Thing ‘that cannot be ‘gentrified’’ (Žižek 2005: 320) and 
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remains forever Other, and crossed out: %. The realisation of the radical Otherness 
signals the emergence of true subjectivity: ∃ the barred S is the algorithm for the subject 
in Lacanian theory. From Lacan’s schema L, to Jin Yong’s schema L, only two extra 
strokes are needed. S becomes ∃, and A becomes %. The crossed out subject 
corresponds to the barred Other.  
                        
 (Es) ∃ a′ (other) 
  
(ego) a % (Other) 
                             
Fig. 3. Schema L with the split S, and split A 
 
The unfathomableness of the radical Other is indeed terrifying; however, its abyssal 
emptiness is also what makes an answer possible: the cruel forced choice of ‘Han or 
Khitan’ at the same time promises ‘absolute freedom, autonomy and responsibility’ 
(Žižek 2005: 309). As long as one acts, one is responsible, and dutiful, as the subject. 
And then Qiao/Xiao Feng acts by ending his life when forced to make a choice 
between the two loyalties to his two fatherlands when the Liao army is battling with the 
Song people. Is his death a sacrifice for nothing? Or is it an imaginary trade-off for a few 
years’ peace between the two empires? Does it achieve anything if years later the Liao 
will still send troops to invade the Song? If it is a death for nothing, can we still see him 
as a hero? It is % that allows us to ask questions regarding the subject Qiao/Xiao Feng. 
And perhaps we are now a little more ready to answer these questions after having 
reviewed the vicissitudes of Lacan’s big Other. 
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Notes 
                                                        
1 Lacan (2006: 462) draws out the schema R as a spin-off of the schema L with a couple of 
extra dimensions, one of them being the trio of I (ego ideal), M (mother) and P (père; name-of-
the-Father) of Ideal Ego-Mother-Father.  
 
2 The Sadean subject is also one that performs the role of the big Other. The Sadean subject 
sees it as his duty to supervise the process of Nature and act on its behalf. As far as he is 
concerned, the more death and destruction the better, as this gives birth to the new. This is how 
the Sadean subject believes Nature functions. 
 
3 Portrayal of a ‘barbaric’ tribe is a common trope in the martial arts fiction, a genre that is 
centred upon the master signifier of ‘Chineseness’. The ‘barbaric’ qualities of a non-Han tribe 
include robustness, genuineness, dislike of lies, and therefore impulsiveness. Such an 
antagonism between the central civilisation and other ‘tribal’ people is a regular set-up of other 
genre writings like the westerns or sci-fis. 
 
4 In The Giant Eagle and Its Companion, one of the half-said answers to the ethical call is Guo 
Jing’s motto, ‘To be a grand xia is to put one’s country and people first (weiguo-weimin, xia zhi 
da zhe)’ (Jin Yong 1976, chap. 21 and 22:). Guo Jing is at the position of leading the Han 
people to withstand the invasion from the Mongolians. For the national cause he is willing to 
sacrifice his family life, or even lives of his children. 
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